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Abstract
This paper presents an endogenous growth model where the telecommunications
industry is the engine of growth. In such a framework, it analyzes how the mar-
ket structure of the telecommunications industry can matter for its contribution to
long-run growth. It shows that policies which increase the number of firms and/or
toughen competition imply higher innovative effort in the telecommunications in-
dustry and strengthen its contribution. Modeling entry into the telecommunications
industry, this paper also shows that the entry either stops after a number of firms
have entered or continues permanently. In the long-run, it is socially optimal to
have permanent entry. This can necessitate subsidies to entry into the telecommu-
nications industry.
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1 Introduction
A vast empirical literature suggests that the telecommunications industry makes a
significant contribution to economic growth (e.g., Ro¨ller and Waverman, 2001).1 Ac-
cording to the theory and many empirical studies, this contribution can depend on
the market structure of the telecommunications industry since the market structure
can affect, for example, competitive pressure in the industry and therefore the incen-
tives to innovate (e.g., Blundell et al., 1999; Vives, 2008). The market structure can
also determine the inefficiencies stemming from the market power of telecommuni-
cation firms (telecom firms). These inefficiencies can alter the demand for the goods
produced in the telecommunications industry, which can also affect its contribution
to economic growth.
This type of inefficiencies have motivated, for instance, the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 in the US and Directives 90/388/EEC, 96/19/EEC, 2002/22/EC, and
2002/58/EC in the EU. These policies propose and have motivated already changes
in the market structure of the telecommunications industry in the US and EU coun-
tries. Recently, the wave of privatization of state owned telecom firms and the entry
of new firms into the telecommunications industry has been the norm almost ev-
erywhere. As a result, telecommunications markets have become less concentrated
commonly featuring more than a handful of big firms. These policies aim also at
promoting the demand for telecommunications and innovation in the telecommuni-
cations industry. Policy makers motivate the promotion of the demand, for instance,
by the external benefits from the use of telecommunications.
This paper models the telecommunications industry as the engine of economic
growth in a general equilibrium framework. It assumes that telecom firms have
market power and models intra-firm R&D that improves the productivity of telecom
firms (or the quality of telecommunications goods; e.g., the discovery and applica-
tion of digital technologies). The theoretical framework of this paper also allows
the telecom firms to engage in R&D partnerships and cross-licensing activities. The
significance of such partnerships and activities is largely documented for the telecom-
munications industry and other high-tech industries (see, for instance, Hagedoorn,
1993, 2002).2 According to anecdotal and empirical evidence it can significantly am-
1See also Oulton (2012) for a growth accounting exercise for information and communication tech-
nologies, which include telecommunications.
2The telecom firms’ final outputs are, for instance, telephone calls and the internet. Although part
of the innovation/R&D for the telecommunications industry may not take place in this industry
per se, in this paper the R&D process is modeled within telecom firms and the licensing activities
are modeled across these firms. As long as innovation is paid its fair price, these assumptions do
not drive the results of this paper.
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plify the innovation in such industries (see, for instance, Grindley and Teece, 1997;
Belderbos et al., 2004).
In such a framework, this paper analyzes how the market structure of the
telecommunications industry can affect its contribution to growth, while focusing
on a symmetric equilibrium and balanced growth path analysis.3 Given that the
market structure matters, the type of competition in the telecommunications in-
dustry (i.e., Cournot or Bertrand) can also play a role. Therefore, in addition, this
paper suggests a link between economic growth and the type of competition in the
telecommunications industry.
In line with the network economics literature (e.g., Gandal, 1995), this paper in-
corporates (direct) network externalities which increase the value of using telecom-
munications (telecom goods) with the level of adoption and use of telecommunica-
tions.4 In light of productivity improvements in telecom goods production, however,
this paper replaces the level of adoption and use by the effective level of adoption
and use, which seems to be novel at least in the aggregate level studies related to
telecommunications.5 The intuition for such replacement is as follows: both the
number of users and, for instance, the fault rate of lines, can affect the network
externalities.
The theoretical results suggest that policies which increase the number of firms
promote innovative effort in the telecommunications industry. Therefore, such poli-
cies increase the contribution of this industry to long-run growth. The driver be-
hind this result are the relative price distortions. These distortions stem from the
market power of telecom firms and increase the relative price of R&D inputs of tele-
com firms. Increasing the number of telecom firms increases competitive pressure
and reduces relative price distortions, which motives higher investments in R&D.
The same result holds if competition type changes and becomes tougher (Bertrand
vs. Cournot). The telecommunications industry also contributes more to long-run
growth if network externalities are stronger.
Further, I consider the case when entry into the telecommunications industry
is deregulated and endogenize entry into the telecommunications industry assum-
ing that it entails endogenous sunk costs. These entry costs represent the capital
investments of entrant telecom firms.
The results suggest that, depending on the economy, the entry either stops after
3See Bourreau and Dogˇan (2001) for a discussion of a relationship between regulation and innovation
in the telecommunications industry.
4The existence of such externalities, although seems to be intuitive, does not have universal empirical
support (e.g., see Ro¨ller and Waverman, 2001; Stiroh, 2003).
5To my best knowledge this is novel also for micro level studies related to telecommunications.
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some number of firms have entered or it continues forever. In the first case, the
number of firms in the economy will be always finite, while in the second case it
grows permanently. The drivers of this result are the investments in innovation
for productivity improvement, which are fixed costs. The entry of firms erodes
the revenues per firm, and these costs can be so high that the new entrant would
have negative profits. Although, the case when the number of firms is finite in the
long-run seems to be more plausible, it seems hard to rule out the case when it
grows permanently. In turn, according to the results, in the social optimum (the
Social Planner’s optimal choice) there is permanent entry in the long-run. This can
necessitate subsidies to the entry into the telecommunications industry.
The result that more intensive competition, because of entry into the telecom-
munications industry, promotes innovation and growth is consistent with empirical
findings of Boylaud and Nicoletti (2001), Li and Xu (2004) and Paleologos and
Polemis (2013). It is also consistent with more aggregate-level empirical findings of
Blundell et al. (1999), Griffith et al. (2010), and Barone and Cingano (2011).6
This paper is related to studies which suggest how economic growth can be
affected by imperfect competition in an industry where the firms engage in intra-firm
R&D and to studies which analyze the impact of information and communication
technologies on growth (e.g., Smulders and van de Klundert, 1995; Venturini, 2007;
Vourvachaki, 2009; Jerbashian, 2014). It contributes to these studies by showing how
the continuous entry of firms can affect the intra-firm R&D process when there is
knowledge licensing. It also contributes by showing that depending on the economy
the entry of firms either stops after a finite number of firms have entered or continues
permanently.
This paper is also closely related to the literature which suggests a positive im-
pact of telecommunications on the aggregate economy (e.g., Ro¨ller and Waverman,
2001; Koutroumpis, 2009; Czernich et al., 2011; Paleologos and Polemis, 2013). It
contributes to this literature by showing how the market structure of the telecom-
munications industry and the type of competition in that industry can affect the
contribution of the telecommunications industry to long-run growth. It also suggests
the market structure of the telecommunications industry that is socially optimal in
the long-run, which seems to be an open question in the literature (see Ro¨ller and
Waverman, 2001).
The model presented in this paper is a general endogenous growth model (for
similar models see Romer, 1990; van de Klundert and Smulders, 1997; Minniti, 2010).
6The empirical debate about the relationship between competition and innovation seems far from
being settled. For example, in contrast to these papers, Aghion et al. (2005) find that the relation-
ship has an inverted-U shape, while Hashmi (2013) finds a mildly negative relationship.
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The adoption of such a model involves trade-offs. This model is well suited for the
purpose of this paper since it allows explicit accounting for the channels through
which the telecommunications industry and its market structure can affect the ag-
gregate performance and long-run growth. On the other hand, however, this model
abstracts from many of the complex details of the telecommunications industry. For
example, it abstracts from market interactions at platform level (e.g., broadband vs.
fixed line telephony) as well as interactions at platform-service level (e.g., broadband
and television services). It does not capture product-level differences (e.g., cable and
broadband) and differences in the demand for telecommunications (e.g., small vs.
large firms). It also abstracts from state ownership of telecom firms as can be ob-
served in some countries. Admittedly, this limits the sharpness of its inference for
the telecommunications industry and policy recommendations.
From another perspective, this general model can have other applications as
well. The only part of the model that might be hard to justify for other industries is
the externalities associated with the use of telecommunications. For non-high-tech
industries it can also be hard to justify the intra-firm R&D process and knowledge
(patent) licensing.
The next section presents the model and offers the optimal rules. Section 3
analyzes the features of dynamic equilibrium. It also offers the socially optimal allo-
cations, compares these with the decentralized equilibrium allocations and suggests
some comparative statics. Section 4 concludes. Proofs of propositions offered in the
text are available in online appendices of this paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical and infinitely lived households
of mass one. The representative household is endowed with a fixed amount of labor
(L). It inelastically supplies the labor to firms which produce homogenous final
goods and to telecom firms. The household has a CIES instantaneous utility function
with an intertemporal substitution parameter 1/θ and discounts the future streams
of utility with rate ρ (θ, ρ > 0). The utility gains are from the consumption of
amount C of final goods. The lifetime utility of the household is
U =
+∞∫
0
C1−θt − 1
1− θ exp (−ρt) dt. (1)
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The household finances its expenses through labor income wL and through re-
turns r on its asset holdings A. The household’s expenses include its consumption
expenditures and the accumulation of assets A˙:
A˙ = rA+ wL− C. (2)
2.2 Final Goods Sector
The household’s demand for the final goods is served by a representative producer.
The production of the final goods requires LY labor andX, which is a CES composite
of the telecom goods xj, j = 1, ..., N , with an elasticity of substitution ε. Ceteris
paribus the increasing demand for X creates positive network externalities in the
final goods production, which are measured by X˜. These externalities increase
the productivity of the final goods producers. According to the literature (e.g.,
Leff, 1984), these externalities can increase the productivity of telecom goods users,
for instance, through the increased capabilities for search and communication over
distances.
The production of the final goods has a Cobb-Douglas technology and is given
by
Y = X˜XσL1−σY , (3)
X =
(
N∑
j=1
x
ε−1
ε
j
) ε
ε−1
, (4)
where 1 > σ > 0 and ε > 1.
2.3 The Telecommunications Industry
At any time t there are N(t) producers in the telecommunications industry. At the
same time, an entrepreneur (a potential producer) decides to enter. If it enters, it
starts producing its distinct type of good.
Firm Entry: In order to enter and to generate its distinct type of good, the
entrepreneur has to invest. It should borrow the resources for the investment from
the household at interest rate r.
This investment generates, for instance, the physical capital/infrastructure of
the entrant. It is in terms of the final goods and has its productivity η > 0. The
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creation of the distinct type of good is given by
N˙ = ηS, (5)
where N˙ is the new telecom good created by the investment S.
Telecom Goods Production: After its entry, the firm stays in the market for-
ever. It discounts the future profit streams pi with the interest rate r.
For ease of exposition I take as an example some firm j. The production of
telecom good xj requires Lxj labor input and has λj productivity,
xj = λjLxj .
7 (6)
In order to support a symmetric equilibrium, I assume that each and every telecom
firm enters with the highest productivity available at the entry date.
The telecom firm can continuously improve its productivity by hiring labor Lrj .
The labor force employed in the productivity improvement/R&D process uses firm’s
current knowledge about the production process in order to create a better one.
Moreover, if the firm decides to license knowledge from other firms (ui,jλi;∀i 6= j, ui,j
is the share of λi that would go to the firm j), the labor force can use a set of
composite knowledge for the same purpose. The composite knowledge is a Cobb-
Douglas combination of the firm’s knowledge with the ones of other firms. The only
essential knowledge input in the R&D process is the one of the firm. The R&D
process has an exogenous efficiency level ξ and is given by
λ˙j = ξ
[
N∑
i=1
(ui,jλi)
α
]
λ1−αj Lrj , (7)
where uj,j ≡ 1, ξ > 0, and 1 > α > 0. This formulation of knowledge accumulation
process ensures a balanced growth path. It also helps to isolate the effect of the
market structure of the telecommunications industry on innovation and growth since
R&D would be at its maximal level if there are no market imperfections (for more
rigorous discussion of the properties of this knowledge production function and its
implications, see Jerbashian, 2014).
The revenues of the firm are gathered from its supply of telecom good and
knowledge (uj,iλj;∀j 6= i). The costs are the labor compensations and its demand for
7The model presented here can incorporate capital accumulation in telecom firms in addition to
the (capital) investments of entrants. That could be modeled similarly to the entry rule (5) and
could represent the infrastructure investments of incumbent firms. However, that would make the
analytical results more cumbersome without changing the qualitative results of the model.
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knowledge. The firm maximizes the present discounted value of its profit streams.
Formally,
Vj (t) = max
Cournot: Lxj ,Lrj ,{uj,i,ui,j}Ni=1;(i6=j)
Bertrand: pxj ,Lrj ,{uj,i,ui,j}Ni=1;(i 6=j)

+∞∫
t
pij
(
t˜
)
exp
[
t˜∫
t
r(s)ds
]
dt˜
 (8)
s.t.
pij = pxjxj − w
(
Lxj + Lrj
)
+
[
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
puj,iλj (uj,iλj)−
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
pui,jλi (ui,jλi)
]
, (9)
(6), (7),
where t is the entry date, pxj is the price of the telecom good xj, w is the wage rate,
and puj,iλj and pui,jλi are the prices of uj,iλj and ui,jλi. All the variables in the profit
equation (9) are time dependant. Here and wherever it is relevant in the rest of the
text, I have suppressed the time dependence of the variables for ease of exposition.
Given that telecom firms set prices in the output market, it seems natural to
assume that as a licensor of knowledge these firms have a right to impose a take-it
or leave-it offer. This assumption is maintained in the rest of the text. It implies
that the price of knowledge is equal to the buyer’s marginal valuation.8
2.4 Equilibrium Conditions
From the household’s optimal problem follows the standard Euler equation:
C˙
C
=
1
θ
(r − ρ), (10)
This equation and the household’s budget constraint (2) describe the paths of con-
sumption and asset holdings.
In turn, normalizing the price of the final goods to 1 and using PX to denote the
marginal product of X in Y , from the final goods producer’s problem it follows that
wLY = (1− σ)Y, (11)
PXX = σY, (12)
(13)
8I assume that the licensors do not internalize the demand for knowledge.
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xj = X
(
PX
pxj
)ε
, (14)
PXX =
N∑
j=1
pxjxj, (15)
where (11) is the final goods producer’s labor demand. Equations (12)-(15) describe
its demand for telecom goods.
I assume that in equilibrium the measure of externalities X˜ is given by
X˜ = Xµ, (16)
where µ measures the strength of these externalities and 1 − σ > µ ≥ 0.9 These
externalities generate gains with the use of telecommunications in two ways. First,
higher use of telecommunications increases X and X˜. In such a stylized frame-
work, this can be thought to represent the traditional network externalities which
stem from higher adoption and use of telecommunications.10 Second, ceteris paribus
X and X˜ increase with R&D in the telecommunications industry. This can be
thought to represent network externalities which stem from better (more produc-
tive) telecommunications for a given level of adoption and use. In this sense, network
externalities X˜ stem from the effective adoption and use of telecommunications.
Meanwhile, using qλj and ej to denote the shadow value of productivity improve-
ment and perceived elasticity of substitution, from the telecom firm j’s problem it
follows that
w = λjpxj
(
1− 1
ej
)
, (17)
w = qλj
λ˙j
Lrj
, (18)
uj,i = 1, ∀i 6= j, (19)
pui,jλi = qλjξα
(
λj
ui,jλi
)1−α
Lrj , ∀i 6= j, (20)
q˙λj
qλj
= r −
[
(N − 1) puj,iλj
qλj
+ ξLrj (21)
+ξLrj (1− α)
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
(
ui,jλi
λj
)α
+
(
1− 1
ej
)
pxj
qλj
Lxj
]
.
9It is necessary to have 1 − σ > µ in order for the production function of final goods (3) to be
concave in X in the Social Planner’s problem.
10The way the network externalities are modeled here is equivalent to assuming that the value of
using telecommunications increases with the volume of the use. If interpreted so, this way of
modeling can be treated as a simplification for the sake of tractability.
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The first equation is the labor demand for telecom good production, or the supply
of the telecom good. The second equation is the investment in R&D (i.e., wLrj).
The third and fourth equations are the supply of and demand for knowledge. The
last equation is the internal rate of return on R&D.
The perceived elasticity of substitution, ej, depends on the type of competition.
It can be shown that under Cournot (C) competition it is given by
eCj = ε
1 +
(ε− 1) x
ε−1
ε
j
N∑
i=1
x
ε−1
ε
i


−1
, (22)
and under Bertrand (B) competition it is given by
eBj = ε−
(ε− 1) p1−εxjN∑
i=1
p1−εxi
 . (23)
In (22) and (23), the terms in square brackets measure the extent of strategic inter-
actions among telecom firms. Moreover, these terms indicate the difference between
the perceived elasticity of substitution, e, and the actual elasticity of substitution,
ε. Therefore, they indicate some of the distortions in the economy which stem from
imperfect competition. In a symmetric equilibrium, when the number of firms in-
creases, these distortions tend to zero since the terms in square brackets tend to
zero.
In equilibrium, final goods and labor markets clear:
Y = C + S, (24)
L = LY +
N∑
j=1
(Lxj + Lrj). (25)
Moreover, the amount of supplied knowledge is equal to the amount of demanded
knowledge:
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
puj,iλj (uj,iλj) =
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
pui,jλi (ui,jλi) . (26)
Under free entry into telecom, the entry investment (cost) is equal to the gener-
ated value from the entry for any telecom firm:
V N˙ = S. (27)
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This means that the telecom firms compensate the households for the borrowed
capital from their operating profits/generated value.11
Together with the entry rule (5) this condition implies that in free entry equilib-
rium the incumbents’ value is given by
V =
1
η
. (28)
3 Features of the Dynamic Equilibrium
I restrict the attention to a symmetric equilibrium in the telecommunications indus-
try and balanced growth path analysis. It is instructive to derive the profit function
of a telecom firm first. In order to do so, I use gZ to denote the growth rate of a
variable Z and denote
Φ (N) =
1
ek − 1 −
gλ
r − (gw − δgN) , k = C,B, (29)
δ = 1
(
N˙ 6= 0
)
. (30)
After a tedious algebra one can write the profit function of a telecom firm as pi =
wLxΦ (N).
Proposition 1 Φ (N) is a decreasing and convex function.
Proof. See Online Appendix A.1.
The competition intensifies with the number of firms N . When strategic inter-
actions in the product market are non-negligible, the intensity of competition and
profits are related negatively. The result that Φ (N) is a decreasing function reflects
exactly this point.
3.1 Balanced Growth
I denote the growth rate of the final output by g.
Proposition 2 The constant growth rate of final output is given by
g = ψgλ, (31)
11Therefore, the households are entitled to the cash flows of telecom firms and, at the level of the
abstraction in this model, they can be thought to be venture capitalists.
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where
ψ =
(µ+ σ) (ε− 1)
ε− 1− δ (µ+ σ) , (32)
gλ =
ξDL− ρ
(θ − 1 + δ)ψ +D, (33)
D =
bσ
bσ + 1− σ , (34)
b =
ek − 1
ek
, k = C,B. (35)
Proof. See Online Appendix A.1.
Proposition 3 The labor force allocations on the balanced growth path are given by
NLr =
1
ξ
gλ, (36)
NLx =
1
ξ
[(θ − 1 + δ)ψgλ + ρ] , (37)
LY = L−N (Lx + Lr) , (38)
where NLr, NLx, and LY are the shares of labor force employed in the R&D process,
the production of telecom goods, and in the production of final goods, respectively.
Proof. See Online Appendix A.1.
The expression in (31) provides some of the key insights. In (31), gλ is the rate
of growth in the telecommunications industry, and ψ captures the contribution of
growth in this industry to the growth of final output. In turn, ψgλ represents the
contribution of the telecommunications industry to the growth of final output since
the model abstracts from other potential sources of growth.
The contribution of growth in the telecommunications industry to the growth of
final output, ψ, depends on, for example, the magnitude of network externalities, µ.
In turn, innovative effort (36) and growth (33) in the telecommunications industry
depend on the strength of competitive pressures in the telecommunications industry,
which are captured in D. Competitive pressures appear to matter for innovation
because they affect the prices of telecom goods. The changes in the prices of telecom
goods affect the demand for these goods and the labor force allocations (36)-(38).
The main comparative statics are offered below. I analyze two cases in order
to highlight the effect of regulations, market structure, and entry. In the first case,
I assume that there are exogenous barriers to entry into the telecommunications
industry (i.e., the number of telecom firms is exogenously fixed). I call this case
11
“Barriers to Entry.” It can be thought to represent a situation when policy makers
regulate entry into the telecommunications industry and the number of telecom
firms. The second case I call “Endogenous Entry” and assume no exogenous barriers.
This case resembles a situation when entry into the telecommunications industry is
not regulated.
3.1.1 Barriers to Entry
With a fixed number of telecom firms the economy grows at constant rates. When
there are (exogenous) barriers to entry δ is equal to 0.
Corollary 4 The growth rate of final output, g, is positively related to the number
of telecom firms, toughness of competition (Bertrand vs Cournot) and to the strength
of network externalities, µ.
The growth rate of final output increases with the number of telecom firms
since higher number of firms implies more intensive competition. This reduces the
relative price distortions that are a result of price setting by telecom firms [i.e.,
1/e in (17) decreases]. Since the final goods producers use labor for production,
the relative price distortions matter for growth through labor allocations.12 Lower
distortions imply higher growth because they are associated with higher R&D effort
and growth in the telecommunications industry (i.e., NLr and gλ increase with
lower distortions). This is also the driver behind the positive relation between the
toughness of competition and the growth rate of final output. Such a positive
relation holds because eB ≥ eC for any given N and ε. The difference between the
perceived elasticities of substitution eC and eB is large for relatively low values of
N . Therefore, gλ and g increase more with the toughness of competition when the
number of firms is low. The difference between eC and eB dissipates, however, as
N grows to infinity.13 These results imply that policies, which motivate entry into
the telecommunications industry and toughen competition, can promote innovation
and growth.
The growth rate of final output increases with the strength of network external-
ities µ since ψ increases with µ. It follows from (33), however, that innovation and
growth in the telecommunications industry decline with µ. This is because, higher
µ does not affect the balance between the demand for the bundle of telecom goods
X and LY and in this sense does not alter the production and R&D incentives of
12In an extreme case when the final goods producers do not use labor, the b in (35) and the σ are
equal to one and the relative price distortions do not matter for growth.
13For example, if ε = 2.5 and N = 2 then eC = 1.43 and eB = 1.75. In this example, the difference
between eC and eB is significant at least relative to the value of ε.
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telecom firms. Meanwhile, in equilibrium it increases g and interest rate r [see (10)],
which discourages investments in R&D and reduces NLr and gλ.
Before proceeding further with the comparative statics analysis, it is useful to
consider the function Φ one more time. On balanced growth path it is given by
Φ(N) =
1
ek − 1 −
gλ
(θ − 1 + δ)ψgλ + ρ, k = C,B. (39)
The profit of a telecom firm will be non-negative if and only if Φ(N) is non-negative.
In terms of gλ, Φ(N) ≥ 0 is equivalent to
gλ ≤ ρ
ek − 1− (θ − 1 + δ)ψ, k = C,B. (40)
Hereafter, I call the growth rate in the telecommunications industry, gλ, which
satisfies the equality in (40) ZP , i.e., zero profit. In turn, I call CME the growth
rate of λ which was derived from the capital market equilibrium [i.e., (33)]. Given
N if CME is lower (higher) than ZP the profits of the telecom firms are positive
(negative).
It is straightforward to show that ZP is a convex and decreasing function of the
number of telecom firms, N , as long as the denominator of (40) is positive, whereas
CME is a concave and increasing function of N . ZP declines with N since the
higher N implies lower profits and lower amount of recourses that can be devoted
to R&D.
Depending on the household’s preferences, final goods production technology,
and R&D technology of telecom firms there are two cases in the economy. In the
first case, CME is lower than ZP for any N . While in the second case, there is
some N∗ number of firms such that when N > N∗, CME is higher than ZP . In the
first case there can be infinitely many telecom firms in the economy since the profits,
thus the value V , are always positive. In other words, the number of telecom firms
can become arbitrarily large if regulations permit that. In contrast, in the second
case the maximum number of telecom firms has a finite upper bound. Therefore, the
number of telecom firms cannot become arbitrarily large even if regulations permit
that (unless there are subsidies to entry).
An important determinant of these cases is the market power of the telecom
firms. Ceteris paribus, the second case would hold under lower market power. For
instance, under Cournot type of competition the first case holds for the following
values of model parameters ε = 2, σ = 0.05, µ = 0.005, θ = 5, ρ = 0.02, ξ = 1, and
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L = 1. The second case holds when ε = 3 and everything else is held the same.14
Proposition 5 The upper bound in the second case can be derived from a zero profit
condition, which is equivalent to a zero value condition.
Proof. 1. The equivalence follows from the fact that V is the sum of discounted
profits.
2. Φ (N) is continuous and decreasing in N . Therefore, the maximum number
of firms is given by a zero profit condition.
It is important to highlight the continuity of Φ (N) since, according to entry rule
(5) and market clearing condition for entry investments (27), the firm N∗ for which
ZP and CME intersect is not in the telecom market. Therefore, N∗ can be treated
as an upper bound for the number of firms in the market.
These two cases are illustrated in (gλ, N) space in Figure 1, where the maximum
number of telecom firms is denoted by N∗ if it exists. This figure suggests that
there are regions of N where the fixed number of telecom firms can be set higher
while holding the profits non-negative. If the fixed number of telecom firms is in
those regions, then policies which increase the number of telecom firms, imply higher
growth in productivity of telecom firms, since the latter moves along CME. Clearly,
such policies also imply higher economic growth [see (31)].
3.1.2 Endogenous Entry
In case there are no exogenous barriers to entry CME and ZP are useful for char-
acterizing the features of the equilibrium.
Proposition 6 Since CME increases with the number of firms and ZP declines
with it, the equilibrium is always stable.
Proof. See Online Appendix A.2 for stability conditions.
Moreover, depending on the household’s preferences, final goods production tech-
nology and the R&D technology of telecom firms, there are two cases when the econ-
omy grows at constant rates. In the first case there are so many telecom firms that
the new entrant’s impact on others’ demand is negligible. Whereas in the second
case, the next entrant will have negative profit streams (i.e., there are endogenous
barriers to entry).15
14These parameters are set such that (i) to be close to the share of telecommunications consumption in
the US; (ii) to be close to the suggestion of Ro¨ller and Waverman (2001) on the average contribution
of telecommunications to economic growth in the US; and (iii) to have low elasticity of substitution
between telecom goods.
15This ordering is possible because Φ (N) decreases with N and investments in R&D are fixed costs.
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Figure 1: CME and ZP
Note: This figure illustrates CME [gλ from (33)] and ZP [gλ from (40)] as functions of the number of telecom
firms, N . Part I of this figure corresponds to the case when CME and ZP do not intersect for any finite N . It is
obtained for Cournot type of competition and the following values of model parameters: ε = 2, σ = 0.05, µ = 0.005,
θ = 5, ρ = 0.02, L = 1, and ξ = 1. Part II corresponds to the case when CME and ZP intersect at a finite number
of telecom firms, N∗. It is obtained for Cournot type of competition and the following values of model parameters:
ε = 3, σ = 0.05, µ = 0.005, θ = 5, ρ = 0.02, L = 1, and ξ = 1.
In the first case, CME is always lower than ZP . On the balanced growth path
there are infinitely many telecom firms and there is permanent entry. The growth
rate of final output in this case is given by (31), where δ is equal to 1. Therefore, it
depends on the same factors as in the case of exogenous barriers. However, neither
the number of telecom firms nor the type of competition affect it. This holds because
the strategic interactions are negligible and the perceived elasticities of substitution
are equal to ε.
Corollary 7 When there are exogenous barriers to entry and infinitely many tele-
com firms, then the growth rate of final output is higher than the growth rate of final
output when there is entry.
There are two forces behind this result. First, the contribution of growth in the
telecommunications industry to the growth of final output, ψ, is lower when there
are exogenous barriers to entry and infinitely many telecom firms than when there is
entry [see δ in the denominator of (32)]. Therefore, for a given gλ the growth rate of
final output is higher when there is entry. This implies that interest rate, r, is also
higher when there is entry. Higher interest rate reduces the incentives to conduct
R&D and gλ declines. This effect is captured by higher ψ in the denominator of
(33). Second, returns on R&D decline with the entry of telecom firms since the
entry decreases the demand for a telecom good. When the returns decline, telecom
firms cut their investments in R&D and gλ declines. This effect is captured by δ = 1
in the denominator of (33). This result holds then because these two forces reduce
15
gλ more than ψ increases.
In the second case of Endogenous Entry, let N∗∗ (< +∞) be the last telecom
firm that will have non-negative profit streams if it enters.
Proposition 8 There is no entry after N∗∗ and N∗∗ is determined from the inter-
section of CME and ZP [point (g∗λ, N
∗) in part II of Figure 1].
Proof. There is no entry after N∗∗ since for any N > N∗∗ the value V would be
negative.16 When there is no entry, the economy is on a balanced growth path.
Therefore, N∗∗ is determined from the intersection of CME and ZP .
Corollary 9 Under Cournot and Bertrand competitions, the number of firms are
given by
NC =
(ε− 1) ξσL [(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + 1]
ε (ξσL− ρ)− ξσL [(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + 1] , (41)
and
NB =
(ε− 1) (ξσL− ρ)
ε (ξσL− ρ)− ξσL [(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + 1] , (42)
respectively.
Proof. See Online Appendix A.3.
Corollary 10 The growth rate of final output is the same under both types of com-
petition. However, under Bertrand competition the number of telecom firms is less
than under Cournot competition.
This result implies that policies, which toughen competition, might reduce bal-
anced growth path welfare if consumers have love for variety. As previously, it can
be also shown that the growth rate of the final output increases with µ.
3.2 Social Optimum
In this section I compare the decentralized equilibrium allocations and growth rates
with those of the Social Planner’s solution and analyze the sources of any difference.
The Social Planner selects a feasible path that maximizes the lifetime utility of
the household. In the social optimum, symmetry holds in the telecommunications
industry due to symmetry in knowledge for production of telecom goods. Moreover,
16Strictly speaking, the firm that has zero profits invests zero. Therefore, according to (5), it also
does not enter. This implies that N∗∗ is the upper bound for the number of firms in the telecom
market. However, since Φ is a continuous function of the number of firms, N∗∗ is exactly the
number of firms in the market.
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there is no market for that knowledge, instead, it is shared across the telecom goods
producers. As in decentralized equilibrium, I focus on the balanced growth path
inference. Online Appendix B.1 presents the Social Planner’s problem.
Proposition 11 The socially optimal growth rate of final output is given by
gS = ψSgSλ , (43)
where
ψS =
(ε− 1) (σ + µ)
ε− 1− (σ + µ) , (44)
gSλ =
ξDSL− ρ
(θ − 1)ψS +DS , (45)
DS =
σ + µ
1 + µ
. (46)
In turn, the socially optimal labor allocations are given by
NLSr =
1
ξ
gSλ , (47)
NLSx = D
S
(
L−NLSr
)
, (48)
LSY = L−NLSx −NLSr . (49)
Proof. See Online Appendix B.1.
In (43), ψS is the analogue of ψ. It measures the contribution of growth in the
telecommunication industry to the growth of final output in the social optimum. In
turn, ψSgSλ measures the contribution of telecommunications industry to the growth
of final output in the social optimum.
Corollary 12 There is permanent entry in the social optimum.
The permanent entry result is due to the absence of market incentives in the
social optimum. It stands in contrast to the decentralized equilibrium result where
it may be the case that there are endogenous barriers to entry. It holds because R&D
in the telecommunications industry increases the marginal product of N . From the
Social Planner’s problem it can be also shown that the analogue of the profit function
in the social optimum is constant and greater than zero. If such a relation would
hold in a decentralized equilibrium, then there would also be permanent entry.
It can be also shown that the socially optimal growth rate of the final output
increases with the strength of network externalities (µ). As in the decentralized
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equilibrium, this holds because higher µ implies higher contribution of growth in
the telecommunications industry and entry into this industry to growth.
Corollary 13 In the social optimum the share of labor force allocated to R&D is
higher than that in the decentralized equilibrium (i.e., NLSr > NLr).
Proof. See Online Appendix B.2 and Online Appendix B.3.
It can be easily shown that this result follows from two factors. First, the telecom
firms are price setters, which creates relative price distortions. These distortions
reduce the incentives to invest in R&D since they increase the price of R&D inputs
of these firms. The comparison of D and DS from (34) and (46) reveals this factor.
Second, in the decentralized equilibrium the rate of return on R&D declines with
the entry of telecom firms. Thus, when there is permanent entry telecom firms cut
their R&D investments [see δ in the denominator of (33)]. In contrast, the Social
Planner has no market incentives. Therefore, it does not have any incentive to cut
investments in R&D in the telecommunications industry.
At the first glance, the comparison of D and DS can suggest that the network
externalities may be a third factor. The presence of these externalities also creates
resource misallocation through relative price distortions, which are due to the not
internalized value from using telecom goods. However, the effect of these externali-
ties, as measured by their strength µ, on NLr relative to the same effect on NL
S
r is
ambiguous, and the proposition NLSr > NLr holds for any µ.
Given that in the social optimum the share of labor force employed in R&D in the
telecommunications industry is greater than that in the decentralized equilibrium,
the growth rate in this industry in the social optimum is higher than that in the
decentralized equilibrium, gSλ > gλ. Since in the social optimum there is permanent
entry, and in the decentralized equilibrium there can be endogenous barriers to entry,
ψS from (44) is greater than or equal to the ψ from (32). Therefore, the growth rate
of final output is also higher in the social optimum, gS > g. These results suggest
that there is a scope of growth and welfare enhancing policies.
3.3 Policy Inference
In this section, I consider a government which sets policies that deliver the socially
optimal allocations as a decentralized equilibrium outcome in the long-run. The
policy instruments available to the government are taxes and subsidies, and market
structure regulation in the telecommunications industry. In view of the results
above, I suggest these “optimal” policies.
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In search of optimal policies the sources of the differences between the socially
optimal and decentralized equilibrium outcomes should be taken into account. In
order to highlight the direction of an optimal policy, the following list briefly sum-
marizes these sources. In the decentralized equilibrium
• due to the price setting behavior of the telecom firms, there are relative price
distortions;
– the telecom firms under-invest in R&D. Moreover, ceteris paribus, they
under-invest more when there is entry of telecom firms since their returns
decline with the entry;
• the network externalities are not internalized, which also creates relative price
distortions; and
• there can be endogenous barriers to entry, in contrast to the social optimum
where there is permanent entry.
In order to eliminate these differences, the optimal policy would fix the resource mis-
allocations through corrections in relative prices. As a market structure regulation,
it would allow free entry into the telecommunications industry and would subsidize
the entry, if needed.
A policy, under which the decentralized equilibrium allocations are the same as
the socially optimal ones, subsidizes the demand for telecom goods (τx). Further, it
transfers to telecom firms subsidies proportional to the value of knowledge (τλ). It
also makes lump-sum transfers to telecom firms (Tpi) and finances these subsidies and
transfers through a lump-sum tax imposed on the household (T ). Online Appendix
C derives this policy. Formally, it is given by
τx = 1− b σ
σ + µ
, (50)
τλ =
N
α
ψS, (51)
Tpi : pi ≡ ν = θ
η
(
gS + ρ
)
, (52)
T = N (τxpxx+ τλpλλ+ Tpi) . (53)
The subsidy rate τx corrects the demand for telecom goods. It takes into account
the price distortions that stem from market power of telecom firms and network
externalities. The subsidy to a telecom firm proportional to the value of knowledge
τλ eliminates the effect of entry into the telecommunications industry on the rate of
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return on R&D. In other words, τλ eliminates the δ in the denominator of (33) given
that there is entry of firms. In turn, Tpi is a lump-sum transfer that keeps the profit
of the telecom firm constant and non-negative in order to guarantee permanent
entry. Formally, ν is equal to rSV , where rS is the return on assets in the social
optimum.17 This transfer is negative if, for example, the elasticity of substitution ε
is relatively small number and ψS is relatively large (i.e., ψS ≈ 1). It is positive if
ψS is small and the elasticity of substitution between telecom goods is high.
Given that this model focuses on market economy, its policy recommendations
do not take into account (usually limited) public ownership of telecom firms as can
be observed at least in a handful of countries. Therefore, they might overemphasize
the need for subsidies if the objective of the public owners is to use their control
for maximizing social surplus.18 Nevertheless, many recently implemented policies
seem to have a structure which is similar to the one of the suggested optimal policies.
The similarities are that those policies promote demand for telecom goods and as a
regulation they motivate entry (Table 1 in Online Appendix D illustrates how the
market structure of the telecommunications industry has changed in recent decades
in several major economies). A prominent example of such a policy is the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996. Despite these similarities, the implemented policies tend
to lack important components. They overlook the incentive of telecom firms to
under-invest in R&D and the negative effect of entry on the rate of return on that
investment.19 They also do not incorporate transfers which could allow permanent
entry, if needed.
4 Conclusions
This paper presents a model where the telecommunications industry is the engine
of growth. In such a framework, it focuses on balanced growth path and symmet-
ric equilibrium analysis. It shows that the contribution of the telecommunications
industry to long-run growth increases with the strength of (direct) network exter-
nalities. Moreover, it shows that increasing the number of telecom firms and/or the
toughness of competition motivates R&D investments in the telecommunications
industry and increases its contribution.
Modeling entry into the telecommunications industry, it also shows that depend-
17The expression rSV is the analogue of the profit function of a telecom firm in the social optimum.
18Alternatively, further policy measures would be required if public owners exacerbate the distortions.
19The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the US envisions the need to foster innova-
tion in the telecommunications industry (see, for instance, the strategic plan of FCC for 2008).
However, the FCC tries to foster innovation by the means of entry and more competition in the
telecommunications industry.
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ing on the economy, in the long-run, there can be endogenous barriers to entry or
entry continues forever. In both cases the growth rate of the final output does not
depend on the toughness of competition and the number of telecom firms.
These decentralized equilibrium outcomes are far from the social optimum ac-
cording to the model. There are three reasons to observe such a divergence. First,
there are relative price distortions, thus resource misallocations, in the decentralized
equilibrium due to the imperfect competition in the telecom market and because the
competitive forces do not internalize the network externalities. Second, in the de-
centralized equilibrium the rate of return on R&D declines with the entry of telecom
firms, which is not the case in the social optimum. Third, there is permanent entry
in the social optimum, which may not be the case in the decentralized equilibrium.
The last two take place because the market incentives are neglected in the social op-
timum. These three aspects imply that the long-run growth rate in social optimum
is higher than the decentralized equilibrium one and that telecom firms under-invest
in R&D in the decentralized equilibrium.
Given these observations, the policies which can increase growth and welfare in
the decentralized equilibrium in the long-run (i) subsidize the demand for telecom
goods; (ii) motivate R&D in the telecommunications industry through subsidies;
and (iii) allow entry and, if needed, subsidize it.
The employed model is well suited for the purpose of this paper because it allows
accounting for the channels through which the telecommunications industry and its
market structure can affect long-run growth. This model, however, abstracts from
many of the complex details of the telecommunications industry such as, for example,
platform and platform-service level interactions and state ownership. Admittedly,
this limits the sharpness of its inference for the telecommunications industry and
policy recommendations. An interesting avenue of further research incorporates
these details to deliver a sharper inference.
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5 Online Appendices (not intended for
publication)
5.1 Online Appendix A.1
The optimal rules (17)-(21) follow from the telecom firm j’s problem. In terms of
current value Hamiltonian, firm j’s problem is given by
HTj = max{Lxj ,Lrj ,uj,i,ui,j}
{
pxjλjLxj − w
(
Lxj + Lrj
)
+
[
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
puj,iλj (uj,iλj)−
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
pui,jλi (ui,jλi)
]
+ qλjξ
[
N∑
i=1
(ui,jλi)
α
]
λ1−αj Lrj
}
.
Clearly, it is optimal to sell all the knowledge since it strictly increases the profits,
i.e., uj,i = 1 for any i.
The ratio 1/ej in (17) and (21) stems from taking the derivative of the price of
telecom good j with respect Lxj and λj, correspondingly. In turn, from (17) and
(18) it follows that
pxj
qλj
=
gλj
Lrjbj
, (54)
where bj = (ej − 1) /ej.
Assuming symmetric equilibrium, the following can be obtained from (7), (54),
and (21):
gqλ = r −
(
gλ +
Lx
Lr
gλ
)
. (55)
From (18) and(55) it follows that
gqλ = gw − δgN − gλ,
and
NLr =
gλ
r − (gw − δgN)NLx. (56)
From (17)-(21) and the market clearing condition (26), it follows that pi = wLxΦ (N),
where
Φ (N) =
1
ek − 1 −
gλ
r − (gw − δgN) , k = C,B.
20
20One way of deriving the profit function is by (i) inserting the demand for any other’s knowledge
(20) into the rate of return on R&D (21); (ii) using the market clearing condition (26) and the
supply of knowledge (19) in the resulting equation in order to eliminate puj,iλj and uj,iλj ; (iii)
using the investment in R&D (18) in order to express the rate of return on R&D; (iv) using the
supply of the telecom good (17) and the investment in R&D (18) in order to find the ratio of labor
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To show that Φ (N) is decreasing and convex function, first, I consider its first term.
It can be shown that
∂ek
∂N
> 0,
∂2ek
∂N2
< 0, k = C,B.
This means that the first term is decreasing and convex function of N . For the
second term,
∂
∂N
gλ
r − (gw − δgN) =
NLx
LY
(
∂
∂N
NLr
LY
)
− NLr
LY
(
∂
∂N
NLx
LY
)
(
NLx
LY
)2 ,
where
∂
∂N
NLx
LY
=
∂b
∂N
1
b
NLx
LY
,
∂
∂N
NLr
LY
=
∂b
∂N
1
b
(
NLr + LY
LY
)
.
Therefore,
∂
∂N
gλ
r − (gw − δgN) =
∂b
∂N
1− σ
b2σ
.
It can be shown that
∂b
∂N
> 0,
∂b
∂N2
< 0.
Therefore, the second term is also decreasing and convex function of the number of
firms. Hence, the Φ (N) is a decreasing and convex function.
Balanced Growth
Under symmetry and on a balanced growth path, all variables in (56) are time
invariant. The return on asset holdings, r, is time invariant due to the standard
Euler equation. The growth rates are time invariant by definition. The total labor
force employed in the R&D process NLr is time invariant since it is proportional
to gλ [see (36)]. Therefore, total labor force employed in telecom goods production
NLx is time invariant.
It has to be noted that the number of firms on a balanced growth path should
be either time invariant or infinite. This follows from the elasticity of substitution
between telecom goods perceived by a telecom firm,
−e = ∂x
∂px
px
x
=
gx
gpx
.
force employed in production Lx and in R&D Lr; and, finally, (v) using the profit function (9)
with the market clearing condition (26).
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The perceived elasticity of substitution should be constant since gx and gpx are
constant on the balanced growth path. According to (22) or (23), the perceived
elasticity of substitution is constant when either N = const or N = +∞. Moreover,
according to (22) or (23), this elasticity is equal to ε when N = +∞.
From market clearing condition (24), the constraint (15), production technology
of telecom goods (6), and the supply of a telecom good (17), it follows that
NLx
1− σ
bσ
= LY . (57)
Given that on the balanced growth path NLx and e are time invariant, the labor
force employed in the production of the final goods (LY ) is time invariant.
From (56), (57), the labor market clearing condition (25), and the definition of
R&D process (7), it follows that
r − (gw − δgN) = D(ξL− gλ), (58)
where D is given by (34). From the Euler equation it follows that
r = θgC + ρ, (59)
where gC is the growth rate of consumption.
From the budget constraint A˙ = rA + wL − C, equilibrium asset holdings A =
V N , entry condition N˙ = ηS, a no arbitrage condition for a telecom firm rV = pi+V˙ ,
L = const, V = const, r = const, and (11), it follows that
gC = gY = gS = gN = gw = gA = g. (60)
In turn, the growth rate of final output, g, can be derived from the final goods
production technology (3) together with the telecom goods production technology
(6). It is given by g = ψgλ, where ψ is given by (32). The growth rate in the
telecommunications industry, gλ, can be derived from (58) and (59). It is given by
(34):
gλ =
ξDL− ρ
(θ − 1 + δ)ψ +D.
Therefore, on the balanced growth path, the labor force allocations are given by
(36)-(38).
The following parameter restrictions are required to hold in order to maintain
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standard regularity conditions, which guarantee positive growth:
ε > 1 + µ+ σ, ξDL > ρ.
It is worth noting that when the number of firms is infinite, the growth rate of
the final output is not a function of the number of firms since the perceived elasticity
of substitution is equal to the actual one [i.e. the square brackets in (22) and (23)
are zero].
5.2 Online Appendix A.2
There are two conditions which guarantee a stable equilibrium. The first condition
is that the entry of firms reduces profits, equivalently the exit increases profits. The
second condition is that the slope of the rate of return from (59) is steeper in (r, gλ)
space than the same slope of the rate of return from (58). The latter condition
implies that when gλ is smaller than the one which satisfies both (59) and (58), the
required rate of return (59) is less than the actual rate of return (58). Therefore,
there is an incentive to raise the gλ up to an equilibrium point where (59) and (58)
are equal.
The first condition is automatically satisfied since CME is increasing and ZP
is declining with N . The second condition is satisfied if θ ≥ 1, which is a standard
stability condition in multi-sector endogenous growth models. I assume that it holds.
5.3 Online Appendix A.3
When there are endogenous barriers to entry, the number of firms can be determined
from the intersection of CME and ZP curves, i.e.,
ξDL− ρ
(θ − 1)ψ +D =
ρ
ek − 1− (θ − 1)ψ, k = C,B.
From this equality it follows that
ek =
ξσL [(θ − 1)ψ + 1]
ξσL− ρ , k = C,B. (61)
Since the right-hand side of this expression does not depend on the type of compe-
tition, the growth of productivity in telecom goods production is the same under
both types of competition. Therefore, the growth rate of the final output is the
same under both types of competition.
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Under Cournot competition, the perceived elasticity of substitution is given by
eC =
ε
1 + ε−1
N
.
Therefore, from (61) it follows that the number of firms is given by (41). Under
Bertrand competition, the perceived elasticity of substitution is given by
eB = ε− ε− 1
N
,
which, together with (61), implies that the number of firms is given by (42).
In order to have positive number of firms, the following parameter restriction
should hold:
ξσL [ε− 1− (θ − 1) (σ + µ)]− ερ > 0.
5.4 Online Appendix B.1
For brevity, I denote
a1 =
ε
ε− 1(σ + µ), a2 = σ + µ, a3 = 1− σ.
From (3) it follows that Y = Na1λa2La2x L
a3
Y . The Social Planner’s problem then is
max
{C,S,Lx,Lr}

+∞∫
0
C1−θt − 1
1− θ exp (−ρt) dt

s.t.
Y = C + S, (62)
Y = Na1λa2La2x L
a3
Y , (63)
LY = L−N(Lx + Lr), (64)
N˙ = ηS, (65)
λ˙ = ξNλLr. (66)
In terms of current value Hamiltonian, this problem is given by
HS = max{C,S,Lx,Lr}
{
C1−θ − 1
1− θ + qY [Y − C − S] + qNηS + qλξNλLr
}
,
where the qN and qλ are the shadow values of increasing the number of firms and
improving the productivity, respectively. The first order conditions and the state
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evolution laws are given by
C−θ = qY , (67)
qY = ηqN , (68)
NLx =
a2
a3
LY , (69)
qY a3
Y
LY
= qλξλ, (70)
q˙N = ρqN − ∂HS
∂N
, (71)
q˙λ = ρqλ − ∂HS
∂λ
. (72)
From (64) and (69), it follows that
NLx =
a2
a2 + a3
(L−NLr) . (73)
Equations (71) and (72) can be rewritten as
gqN = ρ−
{
qλ
qN
ξλLr +
qY
qN
[
a1
Y
N
− a3 Y
N
(
L− LY
LY
)]}
, (74)
gqλ = ρ−
(
qY
qλ
a2
Y
λ
+ ξNLr
)
. (75)
From (70), (75), and (69), it follows that
gqλ = ρ−
(
a2
a2 + a3
ξL+
a3
a2 + a3
ξNLr
)
.
From (66), (70) and (67), it follows that
− θg + gY − gLY = ρ−
a2
a2 + a3
(ξL− gλ) . (76)
Given that the labor allocations are constant, from (62) and (76), it follows that
(θ − 1)g + ρ = a2
a2 + a3
(ξL− gλ) . (77)
In turn, from (63), (65), and (62), it follows that
g =
a2
1− (a1 − a2)gλ, (78)
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where 1− (a1 − a2) = ε−1−(σ+µ)ε−1 should be greater than zero. I denote
DS =
a2
a2 + a3
=
σ + µ
1 + µ
,
ψS =
a2
1− (a1 − a2) =
(ε− 1) (σ + µ)
ε− 1− (σ + µ) .
From (77) and (78), it follows that gλ is given by (45), and g = ψ
Sgλ. I denote these
growth rates by gS and gSλ respectively. In addition to ε > 1 + σ + µ, a parameter
restriction is ξDSL − ρ > 0, which is automatically satisfied if ξDL − ρ > 0.
The optimal conditions (67) and (68) suggest that in the social optimum there is
permanent entry. Meanwhile, the socially optimal labor allocations are given by
(47)-(49).
5.5 Online Appendix B.2
The growth rates of the productivity in telecom goods production in the social
optimum and in the decentralized equilibrium are given by
gSλ =
ξDSL− ρ
(θ − 1)ψS +DS ,
gλ =
ξDL− ρ
(θ − 1 + δ)ψ +D,
respectively. Comparison of these growth rates is equivalent to comparison of the
following expression with zero:
ξL
[
(θ − 1)ψSD − (θ − 1 + δ)ψDS] (79)
+ ρ
[
(θ − 1 + δ)ψ +D − (θ − 1)ψS −DS] .
Entry in the Decentralized Equilibrium
Since in this case ψ = ψS, the comparison of (79) with zero is equivalent to
ψ
[
D −DS] (ξLθ + ρ)− ψ (ξDL− ρ) ∗ 0.
The parameter restriction ξDL− ρ > 0 and
D ≤ σ ≤ σ + µ
1 + µ
= DS
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imply that the socially optimal growth rate is higher than the decentralized equilib-
rium one: gλ ≤ gSλ .
No Entry in the Decentralized Equilibrium
It can be shown that ∂D
∂N
> 0 and ∂gλ
∂D
> 0; therefore, it is sufficient to take N = +∞
if interested in gλ ≤ gSλ . According to (79), when N = +∞, there is no entry in the
decentralized equilibrium, and gλ ≤ gSλ , the following holds
0 ≥
ξL(θ − 1)
[
(µ+ σ) (ε− 1)
ε− 1− (µ+ σ)
ε− 1
ε− σσ − (σ + µ)
σ + µ
1 + µ
]
+ ρ
{
(θ − 1)
[
− (µ+ σ)
2
ε− 1− (µ+ σ)
]
+
ε− 1
ε− σσ −
σ + µ
1 + µ
}
.
Given that (σ + µ) / (1 + µ) ≥ σ, a sufficient condition for gλ ≤ gSλ is
0 ≥
ξL(θ − 1)σ (µ+ σ)
[
(ε− 1)2 − (ε− σ) (ε− 1− (µ+ σ))
(ε− 1− (µ+ σ)) (ε− σ)
]
+ ρ
{
(θ − 1)
[
− (µ+ σ)
2
ε− 1− (µ+ σ)
]
+
ε− 1
ε− σσ −
σ + µ
1 + µ
}
.
The second bracket is always negative; therefore, for gλ ≤ gSλ it is sufficient to have
(ε− 1)2 − (ε− σ) [ε− 1− (µ+ σ)] ≤ 0,
or equivalently
ε ≥ 1− σ (1 + µ+ σ)
1− µ− 2σ .
The last ratio increases with σ; therefore, it would be sufficient if the inequality
holds when σ ≈ 1. When σ ≈ 1, this ratio is equal to unity, and under the parameter
restriction ε > 1+µ+σ, the inequality always holds. Therefore, the socially optimal
growth rate of the productivity in telecom goods production is always higher than
the one in the decentralized equilibrium: gλ ≤ gSλ .
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5.6 Online Appendix B.3
Entry in the Decentralized Equilibrium
Given that gλ ≤ gSλ , the following is true:
NLr =
gλ
ξ
≤ g
S
λ
ξ
= NLSr .
In turn, from (56) and (73) follows that
NLx =
1
ξ
(θg + ρ) ,
NLSx =
1
ξ
[
(θ − 1) gS + ρ] .
Therefore, the comparison of NLx and NL
S
x is equivalent to the comparison of
θg ∗ (θ − 1) gS.
When θ is close to 1, NLx > NL
S
x . However, when θ is sufficiently high, NLx < NL
S
x
since gλ < g
S
λ .
No Entry in the Decentralized Equilibrium
From (56) and (73), it follows that
NLx =
1
ξ
[(θ − 1)g + ρ] ,
NLSx =
1
ξ
[
(θ − 1)gS + ρ] .
Given that g ≤ gS it follows that
NLx ≤ NLSx .
In turn, given that gλ ≤ gSλ , the following holds
NLr ≤ NLSr .
When there are exogenous barriers to entry, the growth rate of productivity in
telecom goods production gλ and the growth rate of the final output g increase with
the number of firms N and with the toughness of competition. Therefore, NLx and
NLr increase with N and toughness of competition. This means that as N increases
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and/or the competition becomes tougher, NLx tends to NL
S
x , and NLr tends to
NLSr .
5.7 Online Appendix C
In this section I derive a policy which delivers the socially optimal allocations as a
decentralized equilibrium outcome on balanced growth path. The policy subsidizes
demand for telecom goods (τx), it subsidizes telecom firms’ R&D so that the returns
do not decline with entry (τλ) and makes transfers to the firm so that to guarantee
that the profits of any telecom firm are non-negative (Tpi). This policy is financed
by lump-sum tax T imposed on the household.
Under this policy the demand for telecom goods and telecom firm j’s problem
are
xj = X
[
PX
(1− τx) pxj
]ε
,
PXX = (1− τx)
N∑
j=1
pxjxj,
and
Vj (t) = max{Lxj ,Lrj ,uj,i,ui,j}

+∞∫
t
pˆij
(
t˜
)
exp
[
−
t˜∫
t
r (s) ds
]
dt˜

s.t.
pˆij = pij
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
+ τλpλjλj + Tpi,
(6), (7), (9).
Let a symmetric equilibrium hold. The optimal rules can be derived as in the
decentralized equilibrium. The lump-sum tax imposed on the household then is
given by
T = N (τxpxx+ τλpλλ+ Tpi) .
Balanced Growth Path
As in the decentralized equilibrium without policy, it can be shown that
gGO = ψgGOλ ,
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where gGO is the growth rate of the final output and gGOλ is the growth rate of
productivity, which is given by
gGOλ =
ξDGOL− ρ
(θ − 1)ψ +DGO + ψ − α τλ
N
,
where
DGO =
[
(1− τx) 1− σ
bσ
+ 1
]−1
.
Moreover, similarly it can be shown that
ξNLr = g
GO
λ ,
NLr =
gGOλ
r − (gw − gN + gGOλ α τλN )NLx,
NLx (1− τx) 1− σ
bσ
= LY .
In order to have socially optimal allocations and growth rates, the policy should
make sure that
gGOλ = g
S
λ ,
NLx = NL
S
x ⇔ DGO = DS and gGOλ = gSλ ,
and
Tpi : pi =
θ
η
(
gS + ρ
)
.
In order to have DGO = DS, I set
τx = 1− σ
σ + µ
b.
Such a policy corrects the ratio of NLx to LY . In order to correct also the ratio of
NLr to NLx let
τλ =
N
α
ψ,
Moreover, in order to have pi = θ
η
(
gS + ρ
)
, I set
Tpi = wLxτpi.
In such a case, given that the labor force allocations should be socially optimal the
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profit of a telecom firm is
pi =
w
N
NLSx
[
1
e− 1 +
(
ψS − 1) NLSr
NLSx
+ τpi
]
.
Therefore, the rate of transfer, τpi, is such that:
pi =
θ
η
(
gS + ρ
)
.
When ψS ≈ 1 and ε is small the transfer can be negative τpi < 0. Meanwhile, if ε is
very large number and BS < 1 then the transfer can be positive τpi > 0.
Under this policy there is permanent entry, therefore,
gGO = gS,
gGOλ = g
S
λ ,
NLGOr = NL
S
r ,
NLGOx = NL
S
x ,
LGOY = L
S
Y .
5.8 Online Appendix D
Many countries have implemented policies deregulating entry into the telecommuni-
cations industry and privatizing state owned companies. These changes have com-
monly resulted in significant changes in the market structure of the telecommunica-
tions industry. Table 1 illustrates the changes in the number of medium and large
telecom firms in France, Germany, the UK, and the US over the period 1995-2007.
Medium size firms have 50-249 employees and large firms have more than 250. The
telecommunications industry is defined as 642 in ISIC Rev. 3 codes.
In sum, telecommunications markets have become less concentrated. These
changes entail growth and welfare effect according to the theoretical model pre-
sented in this paper.
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